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Abstract
　This paper discusses America’s global strategy to build the capitalistic world post WWII 
and the development of the US-led productivity movement in Germany. Regarding Ameri-
ca’s global strategy, we consider the Marshall Plan and Germany’s position in it and eluci-
date the historical characteristics of the Plan compared with those of Dawes Plan in 1920s. 
In addition, we examine the restructuring of the US-led global capitalistic economic system 
in relation to the Bretton Woods System and the framework for the free trade system. 
Also, we analyze Germany’s position in the US-led capitalist system. Regarding the produc-
tivity movement, we discuss its international expansion under the US Technical Assistance 
Program, institutional eﬀorts within the movement, Germany’s response to the expansion of 
the US-led productivity movement, and its historical characteristics and signiﬁcance.
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Ⅰ　Research Problems
　In the postwar era, many European countries and Japan were brought under the US 
global strategy, and by deploying US-led and assisted technology and management methods 
and building a unique system of industrial concentration, they achieved corporate and eco-
nomic progress. Prior to World War II, market problems were primarily the bottleneck of 
business management and impeded the development of productive forces ; however, these 
circumstances signiﬁcantly changed postwar. Domestic market conditions radically changed 
in the interest of protecting worker rights. These trends were seen throughout major Eu-
ropean nations and created conditions for export markets on a European scale. Internation-
al market conditions were not only supported by the US-led world economic system, that 
is, the free trade system and international monetary system, but also were complemented 
by the formation of a common market in Western Europe. Tremendous changes can be 
seen in postwar historical conditions, speciﬁcally regarding broader and deeper global mar-
ket connections.
　In the period immediately following the end of the war, productive forces and economic 
might major signiﬁcantly diﬀered between European nations and the US. Thus, “catching 
up” became one of the most pressing issues in each country. The deployment of US tech-
nology and management methods greatly contributed toward addressing this issue ; the 
requisite conditions for achieving this goal were created with US guidance and assistance. 
In addition, the productivity movement, part of the US global strategy, played a critical 
role in international expansion of organizational eﬀorts. Under the Marshall Plan, “technical 
assistance” created a large-scale framework for supporting learning and introduction of US 
technology and management methods. This new framework enabled the deployment of US 
technology and management methods in Germany, tremendously changing business man-
agement.
　In this way, the productivity movement led to each country’s industrial development and 
the restructuring of their economies on the foundation of US-style productive forces. The 
movement gathered strength in the capitalist economic sphere of West Germany and at-
tempted to build a collaborative circle of capitalistic economic systems beyond comparison 
with anything from the prewar era.
　However, previous studies do not always clarify how the productivity movement led and 
assisted by the US created a path for Germany to become a major player in the economic 
development of Europe and laid the market foundation and basis for activities, through 
which German corporations and industries could enter Western Europe and thereafter the 
Western world. It is important to examine how the productivity movement created linkag-
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es among European markets and created opportunities for Germany to catch up with the 
US structure of productive forces by providing the right market conditions.
　In this paper, we will discuss America’s global strategy and the development of the pro-
ductivity movement speciﬁc to the restructuring of the US-led world economic system af-
ter World War II. In particular, we will examine the following : 1） the framework for re-
building and restructuring the capitalist world under the Marshall Plan, 2） how the 
restructuring of the US-led world economic system shaped the global structure of capital-
ism after the war, and 3） its signiﬁcance for the subsequent development of German capi-
talism and corporations. In addition, we will analyze the signiﬁcance of capital aid under 
the Marshall Plan in the rebuilding eﬀorts of 16 Western European countries and the 
Technical Assistance Plan in shaping European markets. Speciﬁcally, we will explore the 
role of the Marshall Plan in the formation of an accumulation structure of German capital-
ism, which was the cornerstone of many European regions, and Germany’s eﬀorts to gain 
independence from the US. Further, we will address the issues faced with the productivity 
movement speciﬁc to America’s global strategy and European policy. We will also address 
the following questions : Together with the support of the framework, how did the produc-
tivity movement develop and what was its signiﬁcance? How did Europe, in particular Ger-
many, respond to these issues? We will shed some light on these important topics in this 
paper.
　In Section Ⅱ, we will ﬁrst discuss the historical characteristics of the Marshall Plan and 
Germany’s stand on the policy embodying America’s global strategy. In Section Ⅲ, we will 
show Germany’s position in the restructuring of the US-led world capitalistic economic sys-
tem. In Section Ⅳ, we will consider the development of the US-led productivity movement 
and its historical characteristics and signiﬁcance.
Ⅱ　Marshall Plan as America’s Global Strategy
１　US-Led System of Capitalism and the Marshall Plan
　　　― Historical Characteristics of the Marshall Plan―
 We will ﬁrst examine the Marshall Plan and consider its historical characteristics on the 
basis of its relevance to the restructuring of the US-led system of capitalism and compare 
it with the Dawes Plan.
　In the case of the Dawes Plan post-World War I, US aid policy was limited to the de-
feated nation of Germany and focused on capital assistance through private funding. US 
capital assistance was economically and politically motivated in three ways : 1） keeping 
Germany in the realm of capitalism ; 2） receiving the highest possible interest payments 
from the strikingly capital-poor Germany
1）
 ; and 3） reclaiming US war loans from both Eng-
land and France
2）
. By contrast, post-World War II, aid was primarily from public funding 
rather than private due to the impetus of the Marshall Plan itself
3）
. Based on the under-
standing that the reconstruction of the framework in Europe, the “joint action” and “initia-
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tive” of recipient countries were considered prerequisites for assistance
4）
 ; however, these 
would be impossible if each country functioned independently. The Marshall Plan’s objec-
tives were the economic rebuilding and invigoration of Western Europe, with its protection 
from the eﬀects of communism using economic methods. The latter objective was tied to 
the embargo policy against the Soviet Union and its satellite countries
5）
. Further, in the 
1950s, there was a large chasm between Western Europe and the US regarding possible 
production and demand ; thus, another objective of the Plan was to take advantage of the 
unsatisﬁed demands for US production in Western Europe
6）
.
　The primary aim of the Marshall Plan was the provision of capital for a maximum of 
four years on import transactions exceeding Europe’s capacity to pay
7）
. According to a 1950 
report of the third quarter by Germany’s Federal Ministry for the Marshall Plan, assistance 
through the Marshall Plan was invaluable to Germany due to the paucity of raw material, 
capital, and foreign currency
8）
. Two sectors beneﬁtted from the Plan : 1） imports of daily ne-
cessity products, foreign raw materials of high utility, and critical ﬁnished good such as 
special-purpose machines
9）
 and 2） exports from West Germany, which strongly increase in 
the machine industry, transport equipment industry, metal processing industry, and other 
industries
10）
.
　Another signiﬁcance of the Marshall Plan was the eﬀect on promoting investment 
through counterpart funds
11）
, which not only were used in infrastructure and for industrial 
（producer） goods but also facilitated the mobilization of additional credit from banks
12）
. Espe-
cially since 1954, large-scale investments for automation and mechanization became impor-
tant, and credit from the special assets of the European Recovery Program （ERP） acted as 
a detonator in the explosion of capital investment
13）
. ERP capital tended to be used in raw 
materials industries, and was particularly concentrated in the areas of coal mining, metals, 
and chemicals, all of which were faced with bottlenecks
14）
. However, although the percentage 
of self-ﬁnancing was relatively higher in sectors such as the electrical industry, funding 
through the Marshall Plan remained signiﬁcant. According to the Handbuch der Deutschen 
Aktiengesellschaften of FY 1952/1953, the continuation of a large-scale expansion of AEG’s 
factories was ﬁrst made possible through the provision of credit by the ERP
15）
.
　Third, the Marshall Plan played an important role in the restoring and laying the foun-
dation for productive forces in European countries through the Technical Assistance Plan. 
Even among the creators of the Marshall Plan, the transfer and deployment of US-style 
mass production into Europe was seen as obligatory
16）
. Funds from the Marshall Plan were 
given to each country, undertaking overall planning for productivity improvements, and 
methods of technical assistance and the exchange of mutual experience were promoted in 
the program
17）
. The US-led economic system and technologies as well as management meth-
ods were held as models.
　Another initiative of the Marshall Plan was realizing the integration of and free trade in 
Western Europe countries
18）
. The Plan aimed at establishing a multinational order for global 
trade and payments
19）
. Various policies to promote international cooperation in Europe and 
strengthen the capitalist system were coordinated by the Organization for European Eco-
（　　）
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nomic Cooperation （OEEC）, which was established with the goal and regulatory intent to 
gradually remove trade barriers, such as the allotment system in global trade, and similar 
discriminatory barriers
20）
. While the US worked to create conditions for economic restructur-
ing in European countries under the Marshall Plan, it compelled these countries’ govern-
ments to open their markets to free trade and international competition
21）
. By laying the 
foundation for economic rebuilding based on the inﬂux of dollars to many participating na-
tions, capital aid under the Marshall Plan served as an important condition for the creation 
of the international monetary system after the war, which recognized the dollar as the 
world’s key currency.
　The Marshall Plan was also a core element in the rebuilding of Germany’s economy, its 
return into the Western European economy, and the complete removal of policies that al-
lowed the weakening Germany by occupation authorities
22）
. Thus, from this perspective, West 
Germany occupied a central position. In relationship to the anti-socialistically inclined politi-
cal and economic policies, West Germany received capital aid, technical assistance, and 
grants for balance of payments, aiming at a membership with other Western European 
economic organizations such as the OEEC and European Payments Union （EPU
23）
）.
２　Germany’s Position in the Marshall Plan
　Therefore, due to its opposition to the socialist camp and being a defeated country in 
World War II, Western Germany acquired special consideration in the Marshall Plan. Ex-
tensive congressional research on ERP repeatedly emphasized that the Ruhr was the eco-
nomic heart of Europe, and Germany was the pillar of the entire restructuring system
24）
 ; 
Germany’s high industrial production and its foundation that made it possible were the pri-
mary reasons for this importance. Moreover, as aid from the Marshall Plan was kept to a 
minimum due to the principles of “independence” and “mutual assistance” for European 
countries, promotion of German rebuilding was required to pick up the slack
25）
. In other 
words, based on the US government’s understanding that the revival and expansion of 
German industries was necessary for the rebuilding of economic conditions in Europe
26）
, Ger-
many occupied a central role in technical assistance under the Marshall Plan and the pro-
ductivity movement.
　The Marshall Plan was designed to integrate the overall German economy and that of 
the Ruhr region with the economic system of the West through large-scale ﬁnancial aid
27）
. At 
the beginning of 1947, West Germany was supposed to be at the center of US stabilization 
eﬀorts for Western Europe. The Marshall Plan proposed trade policy rules to ease Germa-
ny’s return into the international scene, revive global markets in the mid-term, and develop 
international economic cooperation vehicles such as the OEEC
28）
. The Plan aimed at bringing 
West Germany back into the European fold through the OEEC
29）
. One of the US’ initial goals 
was to reduce resistance from each country toward Germany’s economic rebuilding, by as-
sociating it to the rebuilding of Europe’s overall economy, rather than simply focusing on 
the critical role of Germany and how much European countries were needed to restructure 
the European economy
30）
.
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　Due to factors such as the division of Germany into East and West, West Germany’s po-
sition at the axis of socialist bloc countries, and the relative strength of Germany’s industri-
al productive forces, Germany became a necessary element in reorganizing the US-led sys-
tem of capitalism.
Ⅲ　Germany’s Position in the US-Led System of Capitalism
　Next, we will discuss measures speciﬁc to the restructuring of the US-led world econom-
ic system, and Germany’s contribution to and position in the system. The primary pillars of 
restructuring the capitalist system were 1） the restructuring of the international monetary 
and ﬁnancial system on the basis of the Bretton Woods system, 2） the establishment of an 
institutional framework for free trade as represented by GATT, and 3） systems for eco-
nomic cooperation in European countries under the Marshall Plan, recommended by the 
OEEC and other mechanisms to promote the economy and trade, such as the EPU within 
the OEEC. The restructuring of the global capitalist economic system was promoted as 
part of the America’s global strategy to open lucrative markets with their attractive, yet 
latent possibilities. To enable West Germany’s return into the world economy after the 
war, various conditions were imposed by the US through the creation of this type of inter-
national economic and ﬁnancial system
31）
.
　The Bretton Woods system was a new institutional framework created to guarantee free 
multilateral trade, with the objective of creating an international settlement system that 
could absorb income and expenditure imbalances from the countries. The International 
Monetary Fund （IMF） was the most important establishment within this system
32）
. The US 
dollar, pegged to the value of gold, became the key currency of the Western world, and 
currency convertibility was implemented in the vast majority of Western countries that re-
lied on the dollar. This created a steady foundation that made possible comparisons of 
trade accounting and settlements for all countries participating in world trade. In addition, 
the agreement within the GATT framework brought about dramatic reductions in import 
tariﬀs for member nations, and did away with the restrictions on import and export vol-
umes and other discriminative barriers within international trade
33）
. West Germany was in-
cluded under GATT in October 1951, and had thus restored total sovereignty in tariﬀ and 
trade policies. Around this time, the 38 nations participating in GATT accounted for 80% 
of global trade volume
34）
. Thus, the restructuring of the world economic system was extraor-
dinarily signiﬁcant to the rebuilding Germany’s economy post war.
　OEEC had important implications not only on economic cooperation among European na-
tions but also on the development of the productivity movement. The EPU was a compo-
nent of the OEEC and a critical factor in the success of the step-by-step liberalization 
movement of international trade
35）
. The EPU was not merely a settlement institution, but 
acted as a credit organization as well
36）
. It eased European trade in goods and services, 
thereby expanding trade, and created the prerequisites for the gradual shift to global cur-
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rency convertibility
37）
. The EPU was also an important player in the formation of a regional 
economic zone. As the movement toward a free trade system gained steam, a “structured” 
regional economic zone, or an “organizational” interdependent economic body, was formed 
by the OEEC and EPU, which perhaps may have been termed the Western European eco-
nomic zone at a time when regional economic integration, such as that brought about by 
the EEC, had not yet taken shape. As a “protected market” distinguished from the US, the 
Western European economic zone provided favorable conditions for West German exports, 
creating an export structure further reliant on Western Europe
38）
. Therefore, the entrance of 
Germany into European markets became possible through the EPU and OEEC
39）
.
　In stark contrast with the period following World War I, the creation of basic conditions 
for the advancement of the capitalist camp into global markets with the restructuring of 
the US-led world economic system was signiﬁcant. Opportunities for global exports allowed 
for the adoption of a scale merit theory in investment policies of German corporations as 
well as the successful promotion of mass production within German industries
40）
. Thus, the 
development of mass production, the switch to an economic system that pursued econo-
mies of scale, the restructuring of the US-led world economic system, and Germany’s inclu-
sion in global markets are all greatly signiﬁcant in business management.
　In comparison with Germany, Asian countries, mostly being colonies, lacked mechanisms 
such as the OEEC and EPU that could contribute to trade promotion in Europe. Further, 
there was no emphasis on the creation of market linkages by opening markets within Eu-
ropean countries. Nevertheless, Japan was given the position of a bastion of anti-commu-
nism in the Far East and the role of a factory in Asia. However, due to the conditions in 
each Asian country and the slow pace of development of Japanese productive forces, when 
compared with Germany’s expected role as an economic engine for rebuilding economic 
conditions within Europe, Japan played a relatively smaller role.
Ⅳ　Development of the US-Led Productivity Movement
　As discussed, the economic rebuilding of the capitalist system under the new framework 
was speciﬁcally brought about by the productivity movement that expanded internationally 
due to US-led guidance and assistance. The productivity movement provided opportunities 
to learn about and deploy US technologies and management methods, as well as strength-
ened linkages among European markets. Thus, the movement was critical to the global 
structure of capitalism postwar. We will next discuss the expansion of the productivity 
movement.
　In Ⅳ. 1, we will ﬁrst discuss the international expansion of the productivity movement 
under the US Technical Assistance Program. In Ⅳ. 2, we will examine institutional eﬀorts 
within the movement from the perspective of the US Technical Assistance and Productivity 
Program （USTA&P）. Finally, in Ⅳ. 3, we will consider Germany’s response to the expan-
sion of the US-led productivity movement. 
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１　International Expansion of the Productivity Movement
　The productivity movement was developed during the postwar era as a means for eco-
nomic rebuilding, and its greatest characteristic was that it expanded internationally, par-
ticularly in the capitalist countries where rationalization under the Marshall Plan was car-
ried out by US-led direction and assistance. The US aimed at not only the revitalization 
and industrial development of the impoverished capitalistic economies within these major 
countries, but also the reconstruction of global markets and the maintenance and strength-
ening of the capitalist camp through economic rebuilding in each country. Thus, countries 
under the Marshall Plan were asked to adopt rationalization policies and measures. This 
led to the establishment of the Technical Assistance Bureau in Paris in 1948 and a produc-
tivity committee in the OEEC in 1950/51, which were later reorganized into the European 
Productivity Agency （EPA） in 1953. These organizations implemented rationalization poli-
cies in countries under the Marshall Plan, in particular West Germany
41）
. The international 
expansion of the productivity movement due to the creation of the EPA was an inevitable 
result of the fusion of the two primary goals of US policy postwar : improvement in pro-
ductivity and promotion of European integration
42）
. In the ﬁrst few years of the 1950s, among 
the countries under the Marshall Plan, West Germany was the heart of capitalistic rational-
ization
43）
 and an important country within Europe for the expansion of the productivity 
movement
44）
.
　Next, we will compare the productivity movement with the rationalization movement 
post-World War I and examine the important diﬀerences. The US was involved in the ra-
tionalization movement after World War I, but this involvement was limited to funding ra-
tionalization through capital exports under the Dawes Plan. The industrial rationalization 
movement was individually undertaken by each country, with no leadership or direction 
provided by the US for the movement. As a result, eﬀorts to study and implement US 
technology and management methods were mainly carried out individually at the corporate 
level. In contrast, the US provided strong institutional support at the technical and man-
agement levels post-World War II, which was promoted through uniﬁed guidance from the 
US. This was characterized as a more comprehensive movement to stabilize a system of 
capitalism
45）
.
　Improvement in productivity became key in US aid policies for Western Europe, and US 
anti-communist eﬀorts made during the Cold War era became to provide political and eco-
nomic stability in Western Europe after the war
46）
. However, at the time, independent eﬀorts 
from each country were insuﬃcient, and a speedy economic rebuilding within European na-
tions was not possible without the international expansion of the productivity movement 
under the auspices of US technical and ﬁnancial aid. A report on the Marshall Plan by the 
Federal Ministry for Administration pointed out that, among the countries under the Mar-
shall Plan, productivity improvements could only be achieved through suﬃcient technical 
information and other assistance along with the necessary funding
47）
. After the World War II, 
conditions for the study and deployment of US technology and management methods were 
put in place under US guidance and assistance. Moreover, the USTA&P, a part of the 
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Marshall Plan, was a pillar of this assistance, which we will discuss below.
２　 Development of the Productivity Movement and the US Technical Assistance and 
Productivity Program
　⑴　Characteristics of the US Technical Assistance and Productivity Program
　In contrast with capital aid under the Marshall Plan, US assistance for each country’s 
productivity movement was termed technical assistance. As part of this technical assis-
tance, the US shared technology with European countries for broadly-deﬁned productivity 
improvements, intended to increase the eﬀects of capital aid
48）
. In other words, the objective 
was productivity improvement in European industries through the transfer of US techno-
logical and management know-how. The USTA&P was the speciﬁc program for promoting 
these means. The Marshall Plan and the productivity movement both provided unique op-
portunities to thoroughly research the transfer of management models to other countries 
from the standpoints of both usable volumes of knowledge and the scale and scope of 
know-how
49）
. The USTA&P was created by ERP policy-makers and aimed at reforming Eu-
ropean management practice as well as education and training
50）
. Further, in conjunction 
with the necessity to remilitarize because of the Korean War, the USTA&P heightened ef-
forts to promote the large-scale transfer of US management models and industrial technolo-
gy as a means to stimulate business and production reforms in Western Europe and in-
crease munitions production capacity
51）
. On the other hand, from the perspective of European 
countries, a primary reason for the Americanization of Europe was the desire to catch up 
with US productivity and prosperity
52）
.
　Under these circumstances, the productivity movement was an institutional eﬀort to ex-
port US economic and management organization models to Western Europe and the Far 
East in the 1950s
53）
. The study and transfer of technology and know-how were the primary 
objectives of technical assistance projects
54）
. It was held that productivity improvements, car-
ried out especially through a thorough the transfer and deployment of US management 
methods
55）
 and advanced technologies, were primary issues.
　The purpose of technical assistance was to realize the vast improvements in productivity 
through the promotion of proﬁcient US technology standards through concentrated and 
unique experiences within economic sectors at the national and international level
56）
. The 
USTA&P aimed at achieving the necessary production levels in the capitalist realm of the 
world economy as well as implementing productivity advances by working with the pro-
ductivity centers of each country and providing ﬁnancial assistance and know-how for 
them
57）
. In addition, its objective was the improvement of production and distribution meth-
ods in European industrial and agricultural ﬁelds, amongst others
58）
, and it attempted to in-
still the US principles of mass production and consumption among Europe’s business lead-
ers
59）
. The US intent of economic rebuilding in Germany by inculcating new values was not 
only limited to economic education but also included exportation of US culture
60）
.
　The concept of productivity held two meanings. In the narrow sense, it meant an in-
crease in per capita production per hour or year by using new production technology and 
（　　）
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management techniques ; whereas in the broader sense, it included an attitude toward pro-
duction, human relationships in corporations, and consumption
61）
. An essential goal of US pro-
ductivity propaganda in Europe, particularly in West Germany, was the evangelization of 
the legendary beneﬁts of the “American Lifestyle
62）
”.
　The USTA&P was primarily responsible for the promotion of mutual cooperation be-
tween US and European corporations and industries. However, after 1949 there were many 
eﬀorts to spread US-style business management practices, models for human relations in 
the workplace, and labor relations through various programs
63）
. In the fall of 1951, US politi-
cians and business executives invited leading industrial executives and representatives 
from 17 European countries to tour US cities and factories, and sponsored a joint meeting 
of the two countries’ manufacturers. This meeting was the ﬁrst highly conscious eﬀort by 
the US in the postwar era to ingrain the “gospel of productivity” in Europe’s corporate 
leadership
64）
.
　US technical and management assistance under the framework of the Marshall Plan and 
USTA&P was particularly provided to small and medium-sized ﬁrms
65）
. USTA&P-sponsored 
productivity missions were more eﬀective for medium-sized corporations than large enter-
prises directly connected to US corporations
66）
. Moreover, institutional opportunities for study 
and deployment were also important for large enterprises.
　Based on the above, we see three types of projects within the content of the Technical 
Assistance Program : dispatch of observation teams from various European countries for 
study trips to the US （project type A） ; visits by US experts to Europe for consultation 
and seminar instructions （project type B） ; and study trips within Europe to facilitate ex-
changes of experience, information, and knowledge gained by the Europeans during their 
visits to the US （project type C
67）
）. Objectives of these projects were as follows : promoting 
rationalization and contributing to productivity improvements, implementing rationalization 
and productivity improvements that would serve economy-wide interests, and reporting of 
beneﬁts by the trips’ participants, which would then be made public
68）
.
　⑵　 European Framework for the US Technical Assistance and Productivity Pro-
gram
　Next, by examining the European framework of the USTA&P, we will observe that the 
greatest potential for economic improvement in Europe is through industrial production. 
The primary objectives of the European Cooperation Administration （ECA） were to in-
crease industrial production
69）
. In addition, mass production, productivity improvements, and 
the creation of a competitive environment in Europe were within the main scope of the 
program set by ECA for Western Europe
70）
.
　In most cases, the ECA took the initiative for exchanges of experiences between the US 
and participating nations and those directly between participating nations, as well as eﬀorts 
to learn from the US under the Technical Assistance Program. These eﬀorts took the form 
of proposals for speciﬁc projects in each country’s productivity centers
71）
. Entrepreneurs and 
managers in large corporations, with an interest in US management details and methods or 
（　　）
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new technologies, were not very interested in ﬁnancial assistance ; however, they held 
strong interests in USTA&P and OEEC programs
72）
. 
　Among these programs, the Article 13 programs formulated by the ECA in 1950 built a 
foundation for German policies to implement technical assistance. Some of the main strate-
gies were as follows : the establishment of a productivity center ; advice from US experts 
on the German economic sector, study trips by German experts to the US and other coun-
tries ; communications for technical advice ; and expanding the use of statistics （productivity 
comparisons）, educational ﬁlms, and publications as educational materials
73）
. These programs 
provided the possibility to learn from and implement all types of experiences from foreign 
countries, particularly the US, to develop the German economy
74）
. Speciﬁcally, these were fur-
ther expanded to include concentrated educational seminars for executives and managers, 
test projects providing special assistance to European corporations implementing US-style 
management and labor relations practices, consultant programs, and US industrial visits to 
European corporations
75）
. Small research committees, created within US advisory groups, ana-
lyzed productivity issues and the most eﬀective methods for analyzing problems that had a 
direct eﬀect on productivity improvements
76）
. Even in Europe, education and relevant materi-
als for instructors provided as part of assistance from the US was being seen as necessary
77）
.
　Within this framework of assistance, the Mutual Security Agency （MSA） made funding 
of 117,800,000 Deutsche Marks （DM） available from ERP special assets to promote Ger-
man economic productivity
78）
. However, conventionally large industries, such as the iron and 
steel industry and the chemical industry, did not rely on the USTA&P for organizational 
development and ﬁnancial assistance. ERP assistance emphasized small and medium-sized 
ﬁrms, although the amount of credit available for assistance to these ﬁrms was relatively 
small. Of the aforementioned 117,800,000 DM aid from the counterpart fund, projects re-
quiring less than 50,000 DM of credit accounted for the largest portion （37.4%） ; whereas 
those requiring credit supplies from 75,000 DM to 100,000 DM accounted for one third. 
Projects over 100,000 DM accounted for no more than 10% of the total
79）
.
　However, based on the nature of the Technical Assistance Program, the need for experi-
enced personnel was relatively high, in contrast to that for ﬁnancial assistance. For exam-
ple, from 1952 to 1953, 24% of MSA personnel in the US and Europe were dedicated to 
the USTA&P
80）
.
　The OEEC was deeply involved in the productivity movement, and from 1949 onward, it 
aided USTA&P in organizing a series of programs for re-training and technical assistance 
for management of private corporations in Europe
81）
. The purpose of these technical assis-
tance projects within Europe was to foster mutual assistance among countries in the re-
gion and the exchange of technical information
82）
. It was in this environment that study trips 
at the national and international level were undertaken within the framework of the OEEC 
program that provided technical assistance
83）
.
　In addition, within the OEEC and USTA&P framework for promotion of the US-style 
productivity model in Europe, in 1953, the EPA was established as a semi-autonomous or-
ganization through initiatives by the US and OEEC
84）
. The Technical Assistance Program, 
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previously conceived as a productivity committee within the EPA, fulﬁlled its role of pro-
viding opportunities for exchanges within Europe through the promotion of heightened hu-
man interaction among related organizations
85）
.
　The EPA had four main functions : 1） channelizing US aid to OEEC nations, 2） acting as 
the OEEC’s business department, 3） organizing information exchange among member na-
tions, and 4） uniting the productivity centers of each country. Among these, it fulﬁlled the 
major role of improving business management from the outset of the program
86）
. The EPA’s 
primary responsibility was coordinating the expansion of aid programs for industries that 
were being implemented by each country’s productivity center
87）
 ; however, it was planned as 
a means of transferring US technology, know-how, and ideas to Western Europe
88）
. In addi-
tion, EPA activities included study trips to the US, sponsorships of international study trips 
and conferences within Europe, information and propaganda （e.g., reports, conferences, ex-
hibitions, and ﬁlms）, research and development, education, information services, and ex-
changes of experiences between the US and European countries through technical assis-
tance
89）
.
　Thus, international projects for economic exchanges were undertaken on a large scale by 
the EPA in European regions
90）
. EPA activities were focused on disseminating values and at-
titudes related to modern management issues, in particular labor relations, marketing, and 
sales
91）
. Among these, management education held a particularly crucial position. The core 
objectives of the EPA management education program were the creation of education cen-
ters in Europe and the “Europeanization” of educational content
92）
.
　Although the EPA did not become an important channel for implementing US manage-
ment models, it functioned as a catalyst and promoter of a broad transfer of mechanisms, 
particularly aiding the creation and maintenance of various channels that did contribute to 
the spread of US models of productivity, management education, and labor relations
93）
. EPA 
activities did not focus on the implementation of various policies to improve productivity ; 
instead, they acted as intermediaries in the development of necessary methods, specialized 
education, the promotion of experience exchanges, and the creation of favorable conditions 
for corporations to implement productivity improvements
94）
.
　⑶　Signiﬁcance of the US Technical Assistance and Productivity Program
　Based on the above points, we will next examine the signiﬁcance of the USTA&P, par-
ticularly the relevance of institutional eﬀorts to transfer and deploy US technology and 
management methods through strong US assistance.
　After Germany’s transition from the stage of recovery to that of rapid economic develop-
ment, the emphasis on Americanization moved from the level of institutions to that of en-
terprise. Along with direct investment and technical cooperation （licensing）, the productivi-
ty movement acted as the primary route for transfer and deployment of US-style 
management methods
95）
. US programs and projects exerted a tremendous inﬂuence on the 
introduction of US-style management methods through the formation of networks for US 
and German corporations, associations, government organizations, universities, and individu-
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al intermediaries that served as the basis for information transmission and the spread of 
US management and production methods
96）
.
　However, direct transfer mechanisms such as the Marshall Plan aid, US technical assis-
tance, and trans-Atlantic productivity missions had a very limited inﬂuence on European 
industries. Decisive postwar initiatives for the absorption of US technology and manage-
ment methods needed to be tailored for local environments by deconstructing, editing, and 
reconstituting the elements of the US model. This was done by manufacturers, engineers, 
and bureaucrats who had implemented the imported mass production methods or had ex-
perience using them
97）
. Between 1953 and 1958, the USTA&P allowed the creative confor-
mance to European government and the industrial world out of its own necessity, rather 
than directly adopting US-style industrial strategies and practices
98）
.
　As for the orientation of German corporations to US corporations and the implementation 
of US technology and management methods, although information networks between the 
two countries diﬀered, they shared two supplementary relationships. First, were the eﬀorts 
of the US government, organizations, and corporations through the mid-1950s ; they export-
ed philosophies and models for management and production into Germany through the 
framework of the Marshall Plan and USTA&P, which acted as a type of development aid 
or self-reliance assistance for small and medium-sized ﬁrms. Second, was the relationship of 
free-will orientation toward the US model within large corporations, which was a phenome-
non that could not be appropriately expressed by the concepts of “Americanization” or 
“cultural imperialism in management.” Regarding the former, the trend toward American-
ization reﬂected a disproportionate power relationship between the two countries
99）
. In partic-
ular, contact with the US, and the many opportunities for the research and deployment of 
US-style technology and management methods provided by the productivity movement, 
created important conditions that strengthened this free-will orientation to the US model. 
From the 1960s, changes in market conditions brought about the important trend of stron-
ger adaptation to US know-how in German corporations
100）
. Thus, the free-will orientation be-
came increasingly stronger. Nevertheless, the opportunities and channels for the learning 
and development within the productivity movement framework remained important.
　Furthermore, the USTA&P promoted greater deployment and penetration of the US-
style corporate activity mechanism of “eﬃciency” into German corporations. Even after 
World War I, the principle of “economic eﬃciency” was ﬂagged as a problem, which is 
seen in the name of the organization that was the greatest promoter and supporter of ra-
tionalization, Reichskuratorium für Wirtschaftlichkeit （the National Board for Economic Eﬃ-
ciency）. However, it can be safely said that the USTA&P fulﬁlled its role as a promoter of 
a more earnest pursuit of productivity improvements in German corporations in accordance 
with US-style management principles. It did so by “evangelizing/preaching the gospel of 
productivity” and creating favorable conditions for research, implementation, and transfer of 
US technology and management methods.
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３　Germany’s Response to the US-Led Productivity Movement
　The US-led productivity movement and campaign was positively received by some Euro-
pean nations, although other nations that participated in the movement viewed it with 
skepticism, for example, England and other northern European countries
101）
. Bearing this in 
mind, we will next analyze Germany’s response.
　As we examine the relevance of technology transfer or deployment of management 
methods, we will observe resistance to the Technical Assistance Program due to a weak 
belief in US political organizations and the possibility of incorporating US practices in Ger-
many
102）
. However, at the end of the 1940s and beginning of the 1950s, promoters of Ameri-
canization open to and positive toward US philosophies and methods were no longer in the 
minority. In the ﬁrst half of the postwar era, this was evident not only in US machinery 
and technology, paid for by the Marshall Plan, but also in the gradual transfer and dissemi-
nation of ideology at the heart of management practices and product exports. World War 
II resulted in the weakening of the formerly strong and conservative position of German 
industries, and this change in balance urged the importation of American culture on an 
even broader scale than that seen in the periods between the wars. However, instead of 
an overall adaptation, the US model was a peculiar mix of inherent German traditions and 
practices that imported US methods
103）
.
　The postwar pressure exerted by the US model was extraordinarily strong, and the 
wave of Americanization at the time was much larger in scale than that during the 1920s
104）
. 
Moreover, in comparison to the post-World War I era, the existence, role, and inﬂuence of 
the USTA&P and other US institutional programs in regard to Germany’s response made 
Americanization particularly signiﬁcant.
Ⅴ　Conclusion
　When we examine overall ties with business management, at the global level, we ﬁnd a 
“world structure of capitalism” that reveals the mutual relationships within the capitalist 
bloc. However, given the leadership and aid of victor nations, this structure poses a prob-
lem in global relationships, particularly those in markets and capital, which can be seen in 
the framework for the global structure of capitalism that is centered on the postwar US.
　On the basis of the above discussion, we can state the following about the historical 
characteristics and signiﬁcance of the productivity movement. The productivity movement 
created a path for Germany to become a major player in the economic development of Eu-
rope and laid the market foundation and basis for activities, through which German corpo-
rations and industries could enter Western Europe and therafter the Western world. In 
other words, participation in the productivity movement led and assisted by the US creat-
ed conditions that drew West Germany closer to capitalist markets, in particular European 
markets, by putting West Germany in a central rationalized position within the movement. 
In addition, the formation of a framework with conditions favorable to the deployment of 
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US-style technology and management methods and the subsequent continuation of those 
deployment routes in the period that followed are articularly noteworthy. By creating the 
foundation for a domestic market and conditions in which West Germany could increase its 
role in international markets, routes for deploying US technology and management methods 
that were key to expanding productive forces were inherited during the 1960s. Unlike the 
period before World War II, the productivity movement created opportunities for Germany 
to catch up with the US structure of productive forces by providing the right market con-
ditions.
　Thus, a broader and deeper global linkage to capitalism was created through the inter-
national expansion of the productivity movement, with the aim of providing the most fa-
vorable conditions by combining productive and market forces under a US-centric frame-
work and system of aid. It was under these circumstances that Germany was granted a 
foundation for a reproduction （accumulation） structure for German capitalism centered in 
European regions, which was based on its own interpretation and development of the 
Americanization of technology and management.
　In the case of Japan, the Asian markets did not open up as they did in Europe. This 
was because many Asian countries implemented the productivity movement much later 
than Japan did and had limited trade partners after the war. Thus, Japan had no regional 
market linkages in Asia as did Europe, and Japan’s trade reliance on the US had only 
heightened. The productivity movement within Japan began in 1955, and compared to Eu-
rope, it was not necessarily considered a direct method of economic rebuilding in the post-
war period. These diﬀering circumstances in the expansion of the productivity movement 
created the foundation for German independence from the US and the path to European-
ization through the formation of markets in response to an increase in productive forces.
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